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Appellants Alan and Sharon Trujillo ("plaintiffs") submit the following Reply Brief 
in support of their appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT 3Bs IS IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
IS PLAIN AND REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
At the hearing regarding defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Judge 
Wilkinson ruled from the bench and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
It is undisputed that one of the grounds Judge Wilkinson granted 3Bs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment was that 3Bs was immune from suit under Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act, stating at the hearing: "and that [3Bs] too fall under the immunity act as 
far as the discretionary decision being made.55 (Tr. of Summ. J. Hearing pp. 3-4, R. at 
1009-1013, a copy of which is attached to Aplt5s Initial Brief as Addendum B.) 
The plain language of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act makes clear that 
governmental immunity is afforded only to governmental entities. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-3(1) (1993). It is undisputed that defendant 3Bs is not a governmental entity. 
(R. at 2, 27.) Judge Wilkinson's ruling that 3Bs is immune from suit under the 
Governmental Immunity Act is therefore plain and reversible error. Significantly, 3Bs 
makes no attempt to defend Judge Wilkinson's ruling that it is entitled to governmental 
immunity, and in fact provides no opposition to 3Bs5 argument that this mling is plainly 
erroneous.1 
1
 Apparently recognizing the incorrectness of the trial court's ruling that 3Bs was 
immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act, 3Bs makes no effort to defend 
this portion of the trial court's ruling and instead attempts to limit and divert appellate 
review to the written Summary Judgment, drafted by defense counsel, which makes no 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN WAS NOT UNREASONABLY 
DANGEROUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Under Utah law, a contractor is liable when it executes unreasonably dangerous 
plans: 
the contractor is not liable if he has merely carried out the 
plans, specifications, and directions given him since in that 
case the responsibility was assumed by the employer, at least 
where the plans are not so obviously dangerous that no 
reasonable man would follow them. 
Leimnger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 404 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1965) (emphasis added). 
A contractor is liable for injuries caused by construction done or operations undertaken by 
the contractor pursuant to an owner's specifications, when the specifications cause an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others and that harm is obvious to the contractor. See 
Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975). Significantly, 3Bs does not dispute that 
this is the applicable Utah law, or that it can be held liable it if executed a plan that was 
obviously dangerous. (Aplee Br. pp. 39-40.) 
Judge Wilkinson ordered summary judgment in favor of 3Bs, concluding as a 
matter of law that the UDOT Traffic Control Plan it executed was "not so unreasonably 
dangerous that a reasonable contractor would not perform and carry out said plans and 
reference to affording 3Bs discretionary immunity, explaining that "we focus our 
arguments on the trial court's Order, since it is the Order which is being appealed." 
(Aplee Br. p. 38.) In so arguing, however, 3Bs construes the trial court's ruling too 
narrowly. At issue on this appeal is the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The 
transcript of the summary judgment hearing makes clear that discretionary immunity was 
a basis for the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 3Bs. This is indicative 
of the court's erroneous application of law to the facts. 
2 
specifications." (Summary Judgment, R. at 1034-1035, a copy of which is attached to 
Aplt's Initial Brief as Addendum C.) This ruling is plainly erroneous because (1) plaintiffs 
presented substantial deposition and documentary evidence directly indicating that the 
Traffic Control Plan was indeed unreasonably dangerous, (R. at 642-691); and (2) at a 
bare minimum, a question of fact is presented on this issue which makes summary 
judgment inappropriate. 
In opposition to 3Bs's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs presented the 
following evidence to the trial court demonstrating that the Traffic Control Plan was 
unreasonably dangerous: 
A. Evidence Demonstrating Lane Separation on the Project Was 
Unreasonably Dangerous. 
1. The letter by Shankar Narayanan, 3Bs own project manager, to UDOT, 
dated May 25, 1995. In this letter, Narayanan expresses his concern to UDOT that the 
UDOT Traffic Control Plan was "less than adequate" and the use of plastic drums was 
"hazardous to the traveling public," stating: 
This letter is to reiterate our concern with regard to UDOT's 
less than adequate traffic control design for this project. In 
particular we feel that the use of plastic drums at 100' spacing 
to delineate opposing traffic in an interstate highway is 
hazardous to the traveling public resulting in increasing the 
chances of accidents. 
(R. at 725; see also id at 1685, 1689-94.) 
2. Narayanan's deposition testimony that he wrote this letter because he was 
concerned about the inadequate Traffic Control Plan which did not adequately separate 
opposing high speed traffic and increased the likelihood of crossover head-on collisions. 
(R. at 1681-1682, 1691.) 
3 
3. Narayanan's deposition testimony that he expressed his concerns regarding 
the inadequacy and dangerousness of the Traffic Control Plan to UDOT prior to writing 
his letter to Larry Durrant. (R. at 1681-1682, 1691). 
4. The letter by Larry Durrant, the UDOT Project Engineer, to Mr. 
Narayanan, dated May 30, 1995, indicating that UDOT would take no action to correct 
the dangerous condition unless and until 3Bs prepared and submitted to it proposed 
revisions to the Traffic Control Plan. (R. at 801). 
5. The fact that 3Bs never submitted the requested revised plans. (R. at 651-
652). 
6. The deposition testimony of plaintiffs' expert traffic engineer, Thomas 
Alcorn, that the Traffic Control Plan was unreasonably dangerous and contrary to 
MUTCD standards. (R. at 652-59). And, 
7. Mr. Alcorn's deposition testimony that 3Bs should have known after 
reviewing the Traffic Control Plan and comparing it to the site where the construction 
was to take place, that the Traffic Control Plan was obviously dangerous. (R. at 652-
59). 
The only reasonable inferences from these facts are that: The Traffic Control Plan 
was viewed as being so unreasonable dangerous that 3Bs attempted to inform UDOT 
that it would not accept any responsibility for the risks posed; 3Bs was aware that 
UDOT's Traffic Control Plan was unreasonably dangerous yet 3Bs continued to follow 
the Traffic Control Plan; 3Bs failed to propose alternative lane separation control 
following Mr. Durrant3 s May 30, 1995 letter; and thus, 3Bs acquiesced to UDOTs 
patently dangerous Traffic Control Plan. 3Bs thus executed a Traffic Control Plan it 
4 
believed to be dangerous and hazardous to the public, subjecting it to liability under 
established Utah law. See Leininger, 404 P.2d at 37. 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, and now on appeal defending 
the grant of summary judgment in its favor, 3Bs points to absolutely no evidence 
demonstrating that the Traffic Control Plan was not "unreasonably dangerous," as is its 
burden to carry summary judgment. (See Aplee Br. pp. 41-50). Instead, 3Bs asks this 
Court to jump to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, the Traffic Control Plan was 
not unreasonably dangerous because: Mr. Alcorn's "sole criticism was that barrier was not 
used at selected locations with high accident rates," (Aplee Br. p. 44); no expert witness 
has ever rendered an opinion that the plans and specifications were so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable contractor would rely on them," (Aplee Br. p. 43); and 
"not even Mr. Alcorn feels competent to render an opinion that the plans and 
specifications upon which Ball, Bail & Brosamer relied were so obviously dangerous that 
no reasonable contractor would have relied upon them." (Aplee Br. p. 42-43.) Not 
only does 3Bs fail to provide any citation to the record in support of either of these 
incredible assertions, but the record makes clear each is flatly wrong. 
Specifically, Mr. Alcorn's criticism of the Traffic Control Plan was not limited to 
barrier locations, as 3Bs contends. At his deposition, Mr. Alcorn testified that he was of 
the opinion that: The Traffic Control Plan was deficient because it did not take into 
consideration site/highway characteristics, and did not comply with national standards for 
those characteristics; The speed through the project made the construction zone highly 
dangerous because it was not reduced in accordance with regulations for two-lane 
highways and/or site features; The failure to install a positive barrier also made the 
5 
construction zone highly dangerous and further that a positive barrier should have been 
erected through sections with over-represented accident rates to prevent head-on 
collisions; and finally, UDOT and 3Bs failed to conduct or utilize recommendations and 
project information to make necessary modifications to traffic control. (R. at 2258-59.) 
This testimony makes clear that plaintiffs expert, Mr. Alcorn, is of the opinion that the 
Traffic Control Plan and construction zone were highly and unreasonably dangerous.2 
There is simply no basis for 3Bs' contention that Mr. Alcorn did not "feel competent'5 to 
render an opinion regarding the dangerous nature of the construction site. To the 
contrary, he m fact testified that the construction site was deficient in many safety aspects 
and his opinions make clear that the Traffic Control Plan was unreasonably dangerous. 
3Bs further contends that the opinion of Mr. Alcorn was properly disregarded by 
the trial court because he based it "on a review of the accidents occurring m that area 
prior to construction," and 3Bs did not have access to this accident information. (Aplee 
Br. p. 44.) Not only is this criticism incorrect, but it does not demonstrate whether the 
Traffic Control Plan was unreasonable dangerous; rather, it goes to the weight and 
credibility of Mr. Alcorn's testimony, which is improperly decided by the trial court on 
summary judgment. As Mr. Alcorn's deposition makes clear, moreover, he based his 
expert opinion on numerous things - not just a review of the accidents occurring in the 
construction area, including: the depositions taken; the Traffic Control Plan; the bid 
2
 3Bs takes issue with Mr. Alcorn's testimony because, in expressing his opinions, 
he did not use the terms "unreasonably" and/or "dangerous." (Aplee Br. pp. 40-41 n.7.) 
Mr. Alcorn's choice of words, based on defense counsel's questioning, is entirely 
inconsequential given that his opinions taken in their entirety can only lead to one 
conclusion: that the construction site was unreasonably dangerous. (R. at 2258-59.) 
6 
proposal; the supplemental specifications and special provisions; relevant provision of the 
U.S. Code; UDOT average unit costs and numerical bid item costs; the MUTCD 
manual; the features of the roadway at the accident location; and, the accident rate for 
the section of roadway. (R. at 2241-2244.) Indeed, when counsel for UDOT 
questioned Mr. Alcorn if these were all the items upon which he based his opinion, he 
testified: "I've primarily relied on die contract document and traffic control." (R. at 
2244.) 
3Bs, in addition, attempts to undermine the impact of the letter by Shankar 
Narayanan to UDOT dated May 25, 1995, contending, again without support, that the 
letter was written to express Mr. Narayanan's concern regarding the spacing of the 
barrels, and therefore his letter is not indicative of an unreasonably dangerous condition.3 
The plain language of Mr. Narayanan's letter states, however, that the "letter is to 
reiterate our concern with regard to UDOT's less than adequate traffic control plan." (R. 
at 725.) Mr. Narayanan testified at his deposition, moreover, that not only was he 
concerned about the spacing of the barrels, he was concerned by the hazard of cross-over 
accidents posed by the Traffic Control Plan and the adequacy of the lane separation for 
the traveling public. (R. at 1765.) 
3
 Plaintiffs' contention that there is no evidence that Mr. Narayanan did or would 
have recommended the use of barriers to remedy the problem identified is completely 
irrelevant; the issue is whether 3Bs executed an unreasonably dangerous Traffic Control 
Plan. Evidence regarding what changes 3Bs would have made, or whether such changes 
could have prevented plaintiffs' accident, is immaterial to this inquiry. 
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B. Evidence Demonstrating the Speed Control on the Project 
Was Unreasonably Dangerous. 
Plaintiffs also presented to the trial court evidence that 3Bs' speed control on the 
Project was unreasonably dangerous. This evidence presented by plamtiffs consists of the 
following: 
1. 3Bs failed to reduce the speed limit from normal four lane divided interstate 
freeway speeds to a reduced construction zone speed limit through the curving sections of 
the construction zone TWTLO, (R. at 668-669, 1465); 
2. The posted speed limit on the Project was 10 mph higher than allowed by 
Utah's mandatory speed limit statute, (R. at 668-671); 
3. Plaintiffs' expert, Tom Alcorn, testified that excess speed clearly was a factor 
in causing this accident, (R. at 2266-2271); and, 
4. Never did 3Bs formally seek to reduce the mandatory speed limit from 65 
mph to a lower, safer speed. 
The only reasonable inferences from these facts are that the speed control on the 
project was unreasonably dangerous, demonstrating that the Traffic Control Plan was 
unreasonably dangerous. 
3Bs claims this evidence should be disregarded by the Court, directing the inquiry 
to causation, claiming there is no evidence that had the speed limit been reduced die 
accident would not have occurred. (Aplee Br. p. 46-47.) Plaintiffs5 expert has testified, 
however, that excess speed was a factor in causing this accident. (R. at 2266-2271.) 3Bs 
presented no evidence controverting this evidence or supporting the position that the 
speed on the construction Project was not unreasonably dangerous. 
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C. Evidence Demonstrating Failure to Conduct Accident 
Investigations Creating Unreasonably Dangerous 
Construction Zone. 
3Bs" failure to investigate accidents occurring in the construction zone is further 
indicative of an unreasonably dangerous construction zone. Plaintiffs presented evidence 
to the trial court that: 
1. Monty Smith, the UDOT safety supervisor charged with safety on this 
project, testified at his deposition that his responsibility included investigating cc[a]ll 
accidents in construction zones that there is injury," and that he instructed all UDOT 
employees to provide him with copies of all UHP reports on accidents in the TWTLO 
highway, (R. at 676-680, 710, 2122); 
2. Mr. Narayanan and the UDOT supervisors and safety people all agreed that 
it was essential for 3Bs and UDOT to lcnow of accidents occurring in the TWTLO so as 
to determine whether or not the Traffic Control Plan was safe, (R. at 2008-2010, 1539); 
3. Mr. Narayanan testified in his deposition that this accident information was 
to be included in the 3Bs project log; and, 
4. Two cross-over accidents occurred in the construction area during the 
construction prior to plaintiffs5 accident, neither of which were investigated by 3Bs. (R. 
at 685-867.) 
3Bs presented no evidence to contradict this or to demonstrate that accident 
investigation took place on the Project. The reasonable inferences from this evidence are 
that both 3Bs and UDOT were negligent in failing to investigate the accidents occurring 
in the TWTLO; and that if they had investigated and taken reasonable measures to 
prevent further cross-over accidents, they would have installed portable concrete barriers 
9 
at the curves, including Mile Post 108, before plaintiffs5 accident. It is, furthermore, 
indicative of an unreasonably dangerous Traffic Control Plan. Speculation as to the 
action 3Bs would have taken had they investigated accidents as it should have, or 
whether such measures would have prevented plaintiffs' accident, are irrelevant to the 
inquiry of whether the Traffic Control Plan was unreasonable dangerous. 
In sum, at issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that, as 
a matter of law, the Traffic Control Plan was not unreasonably dangerous. Summary 
judgment regarding whether a Traffic Control Plan was so "obviously dangerous" that 
ccno reasonable man55 would follow them, is appropriate only in the absence of any 
genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Taylor v. Ogden City School 
Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). Questions of reasonableness are "peculiarly 
fitting" for a jury's determination. Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Plaintiffs presented substantial deposition and documentary evidence directly 
demonstrating that the Traffic Control Plan on the project was unreasonably dangerous. 
3Bs comes forward with no evidence that the Traffic Control Plan was not unreasonably 
dangerous. Despite the uncontroverted documentary evidence and testimony under oath 
that the Traffic Control Plan was unreasonably dangerous, Judge Wilkinson found on 
summary judgment that the Traffic Control Plan was not unreasonably dangerous as a 
matter of law. Not only is he wrong in his finding, but he was wrong to make the 
finding. To rule as a matter of law that the UDOT Traffic Control Plan was not 
unreasonably dangerous, Judge Willdnson ignored admissible evidence cited by plaintiffs, 
10 
viewed the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving parties and made findings of 
fact based on the contradicting evidence. 
POIiNl 111 
THE DUTY OF A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY TO EXERCISE 
DUE CARE IN MAINTAINING STREETS IS INAPPLICABLE TO 
3BS AND DOES NOT RELIEVE IT OF LIABILITY. 
3Bs attempts to support the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its favor 
on the basis that it fulfilled its duty to plaintiffs because "a governmental entity has a 
non-delegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets within its corporate 
boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for travel/5 and that 3Bs met this duty here. 
(Aplee Br. p. 19.) This duty cited by 3Bs, however, applies only to a "governmental 
entity," which 3Bs undisputedly is not.4 Nor is there any evidence or argument that this 
duty applies in the context of a highway construction zone. There is simply no basis to 
assume that the statutory duty of care applicable to governmental entities to maintain its 
roads, applies to 3Bs in the present context. 
Nevertheless, even assuming that such a duty were applicable to 3Bs, it would still 
be erroneous to relieve 3Bs of liability in the present action on summary judgment. 3Bs 
has come forward with no evidence, as is its burden as the party moving for summary 
judgment, that it either exercised due care or maintained the road in a "reasonably safe" 
condition. To the contrary, plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that, because of the 
construction and the implementation of the Traffic Control Plan, the road in question 
4
 Indeed, it is significant to observe that, unlike the present case, each of the cases 
cited and relied upon by 3Bs in support of this proposition have a governmental entity as 
the defendant (See Aplee Br. pp. 19-36.) 
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was unreasonably dangerous. (See Discussion at Point II, infra.) Whether 3Bs satisfied 
its duty is therefore, at best, a question of fact which should be reserved for a jury. 
3Bs improperly limits the scope of the duty it owed to plaintiffs, contending that 
it had "no duty to implement traffic control devices to protect the Trujillos from the 
negligent acts of Scott Griffen." (Aplee Br. pp. 18-37.) The question at issue on appeal, 
and before the trial court, is not whether 3Bs had a duty to protect against Scott Griffen; 
rather, the question is whether 3Bs executed a Traffic Control Plan which it knew or 
should have known to be unreasonably dangerous. If it did, the plan and road as 
configured by the plan were defective and they are liable under Utah law for injuries 
caused by the dangerous condition. See Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 404 P.2d 
33, 37 (Utah 1965); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); see also Discussion 
at Point II, supra. This established rule of liability is not obviated by the duty imposed 
on "governmental entities" to "maintain" safe roads. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT EACH 
OF PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT QUALIFY FOR 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION IMMUNITY AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The inquiry on appeal is limited to whether there are sufficient undisputed facts to 
establish that each of UDOT5s acts challenged by plaintiffs qualify, as a matter of law, as 
a "discretionary function,55 thereby entitling UDOT to blanket governmental immunity. 
"Discretionary functions are those requiring evaluation of basic governmental policy 
matters and do not include acts and decisions at the operational level - those everyday, 
routine matters not requiring 'evaluation of broad policy factors.555 Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838, 846 (Utah 1990) (quoting Carroll v State Road Comnfn. 496 
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P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1972)). Discretionary immunity applies "only when a plaintiff is 
challenging a governmental decision that involves a basic policy-making function." 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). The four-
part test, which all parties agree applies to determine whether a given decision or act 
qualifies for a discretionary function exception, is as follows: 
Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, 
omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that 
policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change 
the course or direction of the policy, program, or objective? (3) Does the 
act, omission or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment and expertise on the part of the government agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission or decision? 
Keeganv. State of Utah. 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995). 
On appeal, as before the trial court, UDOT narrowly characterizes plaintiffs5 
allegations as solely for failure to utilize concrete barriers. (Aplee Br. p. 10; see id. At 8, 
9-27.) Plaintiffs' claims against UDOT are not, however, limited to the method of 
channelization. Plaintiffs challenged the following acts and omissions of UDOT: (1) 
Making the Weber Canyon highway a dangerous situation by formulating and 
implementing, without reasoned investigation or study, an unsafe and inadequate Traffic 
Control Plan; (2) Failing to use a concrete barrier to divide the TWTLO highway; (3) 
Failing to reduce the speed limit throughout the winding canyon road construction zone; 
(4) Failing to investigate accidents which occurred within the construction zone prior to 
plaintiffs' accident so the dangerous situation could be mitigated; and (5) Failing to malce 
changes to the Traffic Control Plan to correct the dangerous situation after the 
contractor's project manager, Shankar Narayanan, informed UDOT that the Traffic 
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Control Plan did not adequately protect the traveling public from the likelihood of high 
speed cross-over accidents in the TWTLO highway and that the Traffic Control Plan 
should accordingly be revised. (R. at pp. 4-6, 691-721.) 
As the party moving for summary judgment, it was UDOT's burden to establish 
its right to judgment on the basis that it was immune from suit because each of the 
acts/omissions at issue were discretionary functions. See Estate Landscape &: Snow 
Removal Specialists. Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Tel., 844 P.2d 322, 324 (Utah 
1992); K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994). Further, the facts on 
which UDOT relied to establish discretionary functions must be undisputed. However, 
UDOT presented no evidence to the trial court, by affidavit, deposition testimony or 
otherwise, that each of the individual acts challenged were the result of a governmental 
decision involving a basic policy-making function rather than routine execution of these 
policies at the operational level, as required to establish a discretionary function. See 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623; Hansen, 794 P.2d at 846; Carroll 496 P.2d at 891; Nelson. 
919 P.2d at 575. Absent undisputed evidence that each and every one of UDOT's 
challenged acts were high-level policy-making decisions, they cannot be concluded to be 
discretionary functions as a matter of law. For this reason alone, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of UDOT is plain and reversible error. 
The admissible evidence presented to the trial court by plaintiffs, moreover, makes 
clear that the challenged acts and omissions did not involved the formulation of policy, 
but rather involved the mere execution or failure to execute already formulated policies, 
and accordingly cannot, as a matter of law, qualify as discretionary functions. 
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(A) Formulation and Implementation of the Traffic Control Plan. 
Utah courts consistently have held that preparing traffic control plans does not 
involved the "basic policy making level" and thus is not a discretionary function. 
Specifically: "Although the acts of the state involved in designing the traffic control 
system involves some degree of discretion, as do almost all acts, the design of the traffic 
control system does not involve the ccbasic policy-making level." Bigelow v. Ingersoll 
618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added); accord Frank v. State. 613 P.2d 517, 
520 (Utah 1980)). Further, "The decision to build the highway and specifying its 
general location were discretionary functions, but the preparing of plans and 
specifications, and the supervision of the manner in which the work was carried out 
cannot be labeled discretionary functions.3' Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 
1975) (emphasis added). UDOT presents no argument or authority whatsoever to 
dispute this established Utah law. 
To overcome this well-accepted rule that designing a Traffic Control Plan is not a 
discretionary function, UDOT attempts to create facts indicating that in this particular 
instance a discretionary function was exercised. Specifically, UDOT refers to "the UDOT 
design team," claims UDOT "carefully evaluated, reviewed, and approved [the Traffic 
Control Plan] at several UDOT levels," and asserts that the lane separation methods 
themselves were "discussed and debated in detail by experienced engineers with expertise 
in weighing competing policy considerations." (Aplee Br. pp. 17-18.) UDOPs effort to 
characterize the formulation of the Traffic Control Plan as basic policy-making contorts 
the facts and is done without even one citation to the record or to any other shred of 
evidence which would have been before the trial court. 
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The undisputed facts before the trial court were to the contrary and consisted of 
the following 
1 The Traffic Control Plan was designed by one lower level UDOT 
employee, Jim Thompson, without any studies regardmg safety of the traffic separation 
devices or any substantive review or debate regarding the separation devices by any other 
UDOT employees or committees prior to implementation, (R at 660-661, 697-700), 
2 Bruce Swenson, the UDOT region design engineer, testified at his 
deposition that he assigned Jim Thompson to design the Traffic Control Plan and that 
Mr Thompson was assisted only by "drafting people" in his office, but no other 
engineers, (R at 1818-19), and, 
3 Jim Thompson failed the professional engineering exam and retired without 
ever passing it (R at 1815-17 ) 
These undisputed facts make clear that, in designing and implementing the Traffic 
Control Plan, Jim Thompson was merely makmg practical operational choices of how to 
specifically carry out the previously made policy decision to reconstruct the Weber 
Canyon highway Therefore, unlike UDOT's decision to perform the Weber Canyon 
highway construction here at issue, the formulation of the Traffic Control Plan and the 
implementation of this Plan are not discretionary functions and are thus not entitled to 
governmental immunity 
(B) Failure to Separate the TWTLO Highway With Concrete Barriers. 
The evidence before the trial court, moreover, makes clear that the decision to not 
utilize concrete barriers to separate the TWTLO highway through the construction zone 
16 
of the winding Weber Canyon was made by default at the operational level and therefore 
cannot qualify as a discretionary function. 
By administrative regulation, UDOT adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices ("MUTCD"). (R. at 662-663.) Factors that MUTCD state need to be 
evaluated when making a determination as to whether barriers be used in an interstate 
setting include speed, length of the construction site, length of the construction time and 
vertical and horizontal curves. (R. at 663.) David Kennison, a UDOT engineer in 
Ogden assigned to this project, testified at his deposition that all of these factors were 
present on this site and favored the use of barriers over barrels. (R. at 663, 1992-2011.) 
Plaintiffs' expert, Thomas Alcorn, likewise testified at his deposition that MUTCD 
mandated concrete barriers at the site of plaintiffs' accident. (R. at 655-657, 2271-
2290.) Thus, at the policy-making level, UDOT required concrete barriers.5 
Despite the MUTCD guidelines, officially adopted by UDOT, requiring concrete 
barriers under the circumstances, concrete barriers were not employed and instead only 
barrels were used.6 The only conclusion this evidence supports is that a decision or 
omission at the operational level was made contrary to established UDOT policy to not 
follow and/or implement the MUTCD guidelines and install positive concrete barriers on 
5
 UDOT claims it "did not have any policy or regulation 'requiring5 the use of 
barriers in the construction zone," but these facts belie this assertion. (Aplee Br. p 21 ) 
6
 UDOT, without citation to the record, goes on regarding the "many reasons 
why barrels may be chosen instead of barriers for a highway construction project " 
(Aplee Br. p. 6; see id at pp. 14-15.) Not only is this evidence not in the record, but 
it is absolutely irrelevant to the issue of whether the decision to not use barriers is a 
policy-making decision which enjoys discretionary immunity. 
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the TWTLO. Jim Thompson's decision is not, as a matter of law, protected under the 
guise of a discretionary function. 
UDOT contends that its "basic policy judgment and expertise" extends to the 
decision regarding the type of lane separation to be used on the project, claiming that the 
case of Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995) "controls our case" and requires 
a conclusion that UDOTs actions are protected by the discretionary function exception. 
(Aplee Br. p 13.) According to UDOT, cc[i]f UDOTs decision regarding the height of 
a concrete barrier [in Keegan] constitutes the exercise of a discretionary function, then so 
does the decision whether to use a concrete barrier in the first place." (Aplee Br. p. 13.) 
Such a simplistic approach overlooks the correct test to be applied when determining 
when an act or omission can be immune as a discretionary function. 
All parties agree Keegan articulates the four-part inquiry to be conducted to 
determine whether an act or omission qualifies as a discretionary function. In Keegan, 
the Utah Supreme Court applied these factors to the facts of that case and found they 
were met to implicate a discretionary function. Id at 624-25. There are, however, 
obvious and substantial factual differences between Keegan and the present case, making 
clear that just because the court found discretionary immunity in Keegan, it does not 
support the findmg of a discretionary function here. Unlike the present case, it was 
undisputed in Keegan that UDOT solicited, prepared and evaluated extensive written 
reports regarding cost/benefit and safety, and made a detailed and specific evaluation at 
several UDOT levels prior to raising the barrier there at issue, thereby allowing UDOT 
to satisfy the four-prong discretionary function test. IcL at 623-24. The determination 
that Keegan involved a discretionary function was not, moreover, decided as a matter of 
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law on summary judgment, as UDOT asks this Court to do; rather, the Utah Supreme 
Court made this decision on review of a jury verdict Unlike Keegan, there is no 
evidence in this case that anyone at UDOT actually considered and decided against the 
use of concrete barriers. UDOT cannot point to any document or testimony reflecting 
any actual and conscious evaluation of this issue. If anything, Keegan destroys UDOT's 
claim of discretionary function, not supports it. 
Despite UDOT's unsupported assertion that the use of barrels "involved UDOT's 
basic policy judgment and expertise," (Aplee Br. p. 13.), neither the facts nor Utah law 
support this conclusion as a matter of law in this case. Utah law requires the trial court 
to find the four-part test of Keegan satisfied before concluding a discretionary function is 
at issue. Not only did the trial court fail to engage in this four-part analysis, but the 
evidence presented precludes a conclusion of immunity under this analysis. Specifically, 
UDOT makes vigorous claims of discretionary immunity, but has presented no hard 
evidence to the court that the decision was in fact a basic policy-making decision;7 
Plaintiffs, conversely, presented to the court ample evidence that the decision was not 
discretionary. At a minimum, a question of fact is presented making summary judgment 
inappropriate.8 The trial court's conclusion that UDOT's lane separation decision was 
made at a basic policy-making level is therefore plain and reversible error. 
7
 UDOT repeatedly claims the use of barrels is covered by discretionary 
immunity, but citation to any authority in the record for this unfounded proposition is 
conspicuously absent. 
8
 Although relying on the shield of immunity, UDOT recognizes the existence of 
a question of fact on this issue, stating: ccMr. Alcorn's opinion would, of course, raise a 
triable issue of fact as to whether UDOT made the best choice in traffic separation, but 
because of the discretionary function immunity, that issue is moot." (Aplee Br. p. 22.) 
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(C) Failure to Decrease the Speed Limit. 
The acts and omissions of UDOT employees in failing to consistently implement a 
reduced speed limit throughout the construction zone were likewise operational-type 
decisions. The undisputed evidence establishes that the speed limit through the 
construction zone was not consistently or rationally reduced. 3Bs' employee Rhonda 
Woolsey testified that some 65 mph speed limit signs through the construction zone were 
left up and covered, others were taken down and still others were left up and not 
covered. (R. at 668-669, 1465.) Failure to consistently and appropriately reduce the 
speed limit throughout the construction zone was contrary to the Traffic Control Plan 
and thus is nothing more than an omission or decision at the implementation and 
operational level. This failure by UDOT employees to execute the Traffic Control Plan 
amounts only to negligent operation and does not qualify as a discretionary function. 
UDOT does not dispute this contention or argue otherwise.9 
(D) Failure to Investigate Other Accidents. 
UDOT's failure to follow its own policy to investigate vehicular accidents 
occurring within active construction zones in the present case is likewise indicative of its 
failure to implement the Traffic Control Plan at the operational level. It remains 
undisputed that: (1) UDOT had a policy to conduct accident investigations during 
construction projects and (2) UDOT failed to conduct any accident investigations on this 
project. (R. at 676-680, 710, 2122.) All UDOT witnesses who were asked testified that 
9
 Instead, UDOT attempts to divert attention from the discretionary function 
inquiry, claiming the issue of speed is irrelevant in this case because there was no evidence 
speed was a factor in plaintiffs' accident. (Aplee Br. pp. 27-30.) However, plaintiffs' 
expert, Mr. Alcorn, testified that speed was a factor in plaintiffs' accident. (R. at 2270.) 
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it was important to know the details of accidents in the TWTLO highway at the time 
they happened so that UDOT and the contractor could reevaluate and revise the Traffic 
Control Plan to mitigate any contributing hazardous conditions. (R. at 2008-2010, 
1213, 1539.) The evidence presented by the plaintiffs also demonstrates that there were 
other accidents in the TWTLO construction zone, including two cross-over accidents, 
prior to plaintiffs' accident, but that UDOT did not investigate any of them, (R. at 676-
678, 710), and UDOT was therefore not alerted to the dangerous conditions or the need 
for mitigating the conditions. This is a failure to implement UDOT's procedure, again 
indicative of negligent operation and implementation of UDOT policies, and not an 
upper level policy-based decision not to investigate accidents. 
The only reasonable inferences from these facts are that the acts challenged by 
plaintiffs are not discretionary functions and thus not immune: UDOT made the Weber 
Canyon highway a dangerous situation by formulating and implementing an unsafe and 
inadequate Traffic Control Plan; UDOT's decision to not use a concrete barrier to divide 
he TWTLO highway was an operational level decision and not a basic policy-making 
function; and UDOT's failures to consistently or rationally reduce the speed limit 
throughout the road construction zone, investigate accidents which occurred within the 
constmction zone, and make changes to the Traffic Control Plan to correct the dangerous 
situation created by the Traffic Control Plan called to its attention by the 3Bs project 
manager, were operational failures in carrying out the Traffic Control Plan. 
The trial court erred by summarily ruling that all of UDOT's acts and omissions 
challenged by plaintiffs were policy-making discretionary functions. 
21 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment in favor of UDOT based on his 
conclusion that UDOT and the 3Bs project manager discussed questions regarding the 
safety of the Traffic Control Plan and that after considering these concerns, UDOT did 
not feel it necessary to change the Plan, stating: 
The court would also find that the contractor referred to as 
3Bs?s carried out the plans and specification which were given 
to them, that they did raise a question; that this question was 
discussed; that UDOT did not see fit to change that; 
(Tr. of Hearing on Summ. J. Mot. P. 3, attached as Addendum A to Aplfs Initial Brief) 
(emphasis added). 
This conclusion is wholly unsupported by the evidence and is flatly incorrect. The 
evidence before the trial court, undisputed by UDOT, is that within days of 3Bs putting 
the traveling public in this TWTLO highway separated by barrels only, the project 
manager for 3Bs, Shankar Narayanan, developed concerns over the hazard posed to the 
traveling public by UDOT's inadequate Traffic Control Plan, including the likelihood of 
high speed cross-over accidents. (R. at 1690-1694.) To express and reiterate these 
concerns, Narayanan sent a letter to Larry Durrant, project engineer for UDOT for this 
project. (R. at 1685, 1689-91; see also id at 725.) In the letter, Narayanan told the 
UDOT project engineer that delineating the opposing traffic lanes with plastic barrels was 
unsafe and the Traffic Control Plan design for the project was "less than adequate." (Id.) 
After being informed by Narayanan of these hazards, UDOT took no action. Instead, 
Mr. Durrant wrote a letter back to Mr. Narayanan informing him that if 3Bs had a 
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problem with the safety of the Plan, it should propose to him a safer Traffic Control Plan. 
(R. at 801.) 3Bs, however, never submitted the requested plans to UDOT. (R. at 651-
52.) Narayanan testified at his deposition that he discussed with Larry Durrant his 
concerns regarding the inadequate traffic plan, both before and after the letter, including 
the option of separating opposing traffic with portable barriers. (R. at 1676, 1707.) 
Larry Durrant testified, however, that he did not recall any conversations with Narayanan 
regarding concerns of inadequate lane separation. (R. at 1240; see also id. at 757 
(backside)). 
This evidence does not support the finding of fact made by Judge Wilkinson that 
Narayanan and Durrant discussed their questions regarding the safety of the Traffic 
Control Plan and that UDOT simply did not "see fit to change" the Plan. To the 
contrary, it indicates that UDOT never even considered the concerns raised by 
Narayanan. The evidence makes clear, moreover, a dispute of fact on this issue: While 
Mr. Narayanan testified in his deposition that he discussed the option of separating 
opposing traffic with portable barriers, Mr. Durrant testified that he did not recall any 
such conversation. (R. at 1676, 1707, 1240.) 
The trial court's finding that UDOT and the 3Bs project manager discussed 
questions regarding the safety of the Traffic Control Plan and that after considering these 
concerns, UDOT made a policy determination to not make a change to the Plan, is not 
only wholly unsupported, but to reach such a conclusion Judge Wilkinson improperly 
weighed the evidence on summary judgment. Summary judgment on this basis is 
therefore plain and reversible error. 
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CONCLUSION 
3Bs and UDOT seek affirmance of Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment ruling in 
their favor, characterizing plaintiffs5 challenge as second-guessing administrative decisions 
and taking the position that UDOT construction projects and UDOT-created Traffic 
Control Plans are beyond reproach. This is simply not true. UDOT and its contractors 
should not be shielded from liability when they formulate and implement a substandard 
Traffic Control Plan, and fail to address safety problems brought to their attention 
regarding the Traffic Control Plan. Such challenges do not undermine administrative 
function, but instead assure that UDOT and its contractors will in the future take the 
necessary effort to promulgate safe traffic control when they subject highway travelers to 
die dangers of road construction. If such a challenge is not permitted, neither the 
construction contractors nor UDOT, in whose hands we place our lives everyday, have 
any accountability. 
In granting summary judgment in this case, Judge Wilkinson made improper 
conclusions of law based on the evidence presented. Specifically, 
(1) The trial court's ruling that 3Bs, which is a private contractor, is immune 
from suit is under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, has no basis in the law and is 
plain and reversible error; 
(2) The trial court's conclusion that the Traffic Control Plan was not 
"unreasonably dangerous'3 as a matter of law is plainly erroneous because plaintiffs 
presented substantial evidence directly indicating that the Traffic Control Plan was indeed 
unreasonably dangerous. At a bare minimum, a question of fact is presented on this issue 
which makes summary judgment inappropriate; 
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(3) The trial court's conclusion that each of plaintiffs5 claims agamst UDOT 
qualify for discretionary function immunity as a matter of law is plainly erroneous because 
plaintiffs presented evidence directly indicating that these acts were not discretionary and 
UDOT presented no evidence that they were discretionary. At a minimum, a question of 
fact is presented on this issue which makes summary judgment inappropriate; and 
(4) The trial court's conclusion that UDOT and the 3Bs project manager 
discussed questions regarding the safety of the Traffic Control Plan and that after 
considering these concerns, UDOT did not feel it necessary to change the Plan, which is 
a bases for the grant of summary judgment, is wholly unsupported by the evidence and 
flatly incorrect. 
For these reasons, Alan and Sharon Trujillo respectfully request this Court to 
reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand this case for trial on all claims. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s P 5 ^ a y of August, 1998. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
B 
^ ^ T B T F E R G U S O N 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Alan and Sharon Trujillo 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1998, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS ALAN TRUJILLO AND 
SHARON TRUJILLO were mailed postage prepaid thereon, by First Class Mail in the 
United States Mail, to the following: 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee UDOT 
Mark J. Williams, Esq. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee BB&B 
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq. 
Joseph E. Minnock, Esq. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
136 S. Main Street, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Appellants Alan and Sharon Trujillo 
James E. Phillips, Esq. 
PHILLIPS & LANCASTER, P.C. 
P.O. Box 770 
66331 1 
